Abstract. We formulate a computationally tractable extension of the classical Merton optimal consumptioninvestment problem to include the capital gains taxes. This is the continuous-time version of the model introduced by Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang [Rev. Financ. Stud., 14 (2001), pp. 583-616]. In this model the tax basis is computed as the average cost of the stocks in the investor's portfolio. This average rule introduces only one additional state variable, namely the tax basis. Since the other tax rules such as the first in first out rule require the knowledge of all past transactions, the average model is computationally much easier. We emphasize the linear taxation rule, which allows for tax credits when capital gains losses are experienced. In this context wash sales are optimal, and we prove it rigorously. Our main contributions are a first order explicit approximation of the value function of the problem and a unique characterization by means of the corresponding dynamic programming equation. The latter characterization builds on technical results isolated in the accompanying paper [I. Ben Tahar, H. M. Soner, and N. Touzi, SIAM J. Control Optim., 46 (2007), pp. 1779-1801. We also suggest a numerical computation technique based on a combination of finite differences and the Howard iteration algorithm. Finally, we provide some numerical results on the welfare consequences of taxes and the quality of the first order approximation.
The financial market consists of a tax-free riskless asset and a risky one. The holdings in the risky asset are subject to the no-short-sales constraint, and the total wealth is restricted by the no-bankruptcy condition. The risky asset is subject to taxes on capital gains. As in [12] , the tax basis is defined as the weighted average of past purchase prices, and the taxation rule is linear, thus allowing for tax credits. However, we differ from [12] by considering an infinite horizon problem, as our main goal is to provide analytical tools for this class of problems. In particular, our model does not allow for tax forgiveness at death. Clearly, one should keep this difference in mind when interpreting results for investors with a short horizon.
The investor preferences are described by a power utility with a constant relative risk aversion factor. This assumption is needed only to reduce the computational complexity of the problem. However, with this reduction explicit descriptions of the value function and the optimal strategy are still not available.
This model enables us to rigorously prove several interesting properties observed in practice. Although these results are sometimes intuitively clear, their proofs require careful analysis and the use of the tractability of the model. The first of these results is the optimality of the wash sales. Namely, in Proposition 3.5 we prove that it is always optimal to realize capital losses whenever the tax basis exceeds the spot price. This property is observed in practice and is stated and embedded directly in the definition of the tax basis in [12] . We also prove the continuity of the value function (and even Lipschitz continuity, up to a change of variables). We recall that, in the tax-free models of [26, 9, 13, 28] , this property follows from the obvious concavity of the value function. Under capital gains taxes, the concavity argument fails, and the numerical results of section 6 suggest that the value function is indeed not concave!
The first main result of this paper is to provide an explicit approximation of the value function which follows from an upper and a lower bound proved in section 4. In view of the absence of closed form solutions, such an approximation is useful for understanding the model better. Although this explicit approximation holds for small interest rate and tax parameters, our numerical experiments indicate that this approximation is satisfactory with realistic values of interest rate and tax parameters, as it leads to a relative error within 10%. These findings are reported in section 6. This first order approximation allows one to draw the following observations:
• The lower bound is derived as the limit of the value implied by a sequence of strategies which mimics the Merton optimal strategy in a Merton-type fictitious frictionless financial market with tax-deflated drift and volatility coefficients. The risk premium of this fictitious financial market is smaller than that of the original market. So, even if the optimal strategy in our problem is not available in explicit form, our first order expansion is accompanied by an explicit strategy which achieves "the first order maximal utility value." • In a situation of a capital loss, our first order approximation is increasing in the tax rate. For small interest rate and tax parameters, the advantage taken from an initial tax credit is never compensated by the increase of tax over the lifetime horizon. This is in agreement with Cadenillas and Pliska [7] , who found that "sometimes investors are better off with a positive tax rate." • Finally, the investment component of this approximation sequence exhibits a smaller exposition to the risky asset. This is in line with the risk premium puzzle highlighted by Mehra and Prescott [25] . However, one should note that this model is only a partial equilibrium model and that the level of the equity premium is determined by general equilibrium considerations. Our analysis of the optimal consumption-investment problem relies on a numerical approach based on dynamic programming and partial differential equations. Therefore, the second main result of this paper is a characterization of the value function as the limit (uniformly on compact subsets) of an approximating sequence defined by a slight perturbation of the "natural" dynamic programming equation of our problem. The financial interpretation of our perturbation is, on the one hand, to introduce a small transaction cost parameter and, on the other hand, to modify simultaneously the taxation rule when the tax basis approaches the critical point zero. Our analysis relies on the technical results in our accompanying paper [5] , which shows that the perturbed dynamic programming equation has a unique continuous viscosity solution within the class of polynomially growing functions.
Finally, based on our dynamic programming characterization, we suggest a numerical approximation method combining finite differences with the Howard iterations. Unfortunately, we have no theoretical convergence result for our algorithm. Indeed, establishing such convergence results for Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations corresponding to singular control problems is an open question in numerical analysis, and the existing results, based on the monotone scheme method of Barles and Souganidis [4] , are restricted to the bounded control context; see Bonnans and Zidani [6] , Krylov [22, 23] , Barles and Jakobsen [2] , and Fahim, Touzi, and Warin [17] . This difficulty was already observed in the related literature on transaction costs; see Akian, Menaldi, and Sulem [1] and Tourin and Zariphopoulou [31] . Following the latter papers, we therefore concentrate our effort on realizing the empirical convergence of the algorithm. The numerical scheme is implemented to obtain the qualitative behavior of the solution and to understand the welfare consequences of the taxation. In particular, the numerical approximation of the optimal strategy displays a bang-bang behavior, as expected in our singular control problem. As in the transaction cost context of [9, 13, 28] , the state space is partitioned into three regions: the no-transaction region NT, the buy region B, and the sell region S; but in contrast with the transaction cost framework these regions are not cones.
Notation. For a domain D in R n , we denote by USC(D) (resp., LSC(D)) the collection of all upper semicontinuous (resp., lower semicontinuous) functions from D to R. The set of continuous functions from D to R is denoted by C 0 (D) := USC(D) ∩ LSC(D). For a parameter δ > 0, we say that a function f : D −→ R has δ-polynomial growth if
We finally denote USC δ (D) := {f ∈ USC(D) : f has δ-polynomial growth}. The sets LSC δ (D) and C 0 δ (D) are defined similarly. 2. Consumption-investment models with capital gains taxes.
2.1. The financial assets. Throughout this paper, we consider a complete probability space (Ω, F, P), endowed with a standard scalar Brownian motion W = {W t , 0 ≤ t}, and we denote by F the P-completion of the natural filtration of the Brownian motion. We consider a financial market consisting of one bank account with constant interest rate r > 0 and one risky asset whose price process evolves according to the Black-Scholes model:
where θ > 0 is a constant risk premium, and σ > 0 is a constant volatility parameter. The positivity restriction on the risk premium coefficient ensures that positive investment in the risky asset is interesting.
Taxation rule on capital gains.
The sales of the stock are subject to taxes on capital gains. The amount of tax to be paid for each sale of risky asset, at time t, is computed by comparison of the current price P t to an index B t defined as the weighted average price of the shares purchased by the investor up to time t. When P t ≥ B t , i.e., the current price of the risky asset is greater than the weighted average price, the investor would realize a capital gain by selling the risky asset. Similarly, when P t ≤ B t , the sale of the risky asset corresponds to the realization of a capital loss.
In order to better explain the definition of the tax basis B, we provide the following example derived from the official Canadian tax code. Table 1 reports transactions performed by an individual on shares of STU Ltd and how the tax basis of the individual changes over time. Just after a sale transaction, the tax basis is not changed. However, sales do alter the tax basis starting from the date of the next purchase. Notice, however, that the tax basis is affected only by the number of shares sold and not by the sale price.
The sale of a unit share of stock at some time t is subject to the payment of an amount of tax computed according to the tax basis of the portfolio at time t. In this paper, we consider a linear taxation rule, i.e., this amount of tax is given by
where α ∈ [0, 1) is a constant tax rate coefficient. Our interest is of course in the case α > 0. When the tax basis is smaller than the spot price, the investor realizes a capital gain. Then, by selling one unit of risky asset at the spot price P t , the amount of tax to be paid is α(P t − B t ).
When the tax basis is larger than the spot price, the investor receives the tax credit α(B t − P t ) for each unit of asset sold at time t. Remark 2.1. In practice, the realized capital losses are deduced from the total amount of taxes that the investor has to pay, and the annual deductible capital losses amount may be limited by the tax code. In our model, we follow Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang [12] by adopting the simplifying assumption that capital losses are credited immediately without any limit.
Remark 2.2. Our definition of the tax basis B is slightly different from that of Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang [12] , who set the tax basis to be equal to the spot price whenever the average purchase price exceeds the current price. This does not affect the results, as Proposition 3.5 shows that wash sales are optimal.
2.3. Consumption-investment strategies. We denote by X t the (cash) position on the bank, Y t the amount invested in the risky assets, and
the position on the risky asset account evaluated at the basis price. The trading in risky assets is subject the no-short-sales constraint
and the position of the investor is required to satisfy the solvency condition (2.5)
i.e., the after-tax liquidation value of the portfolio is nonnegative at any point in time.
Trading on the financial market is described by means of the transfers between the two investment opportunities defined by two F-adapted, right-continuous, and nondecreasing processes L = {L t , t ≥ 0} and M = {M t , t ≥ 0} with L 0 − = M 0 − = 0. The amount transferred from the bank to the nonrisky asset account at time t is given by dL t and corresponds to a purchase of risky asset. The amount transferred from the risky asset account to the bank at time t, corresponding to a sale of risky asset, is given by Y t− dM t and is expressed in terms of proportions of the total holdings in risky asset as in the example of Table 1 .
To force the short-sales constraint (2.4) to hold, we restrict the jumps of M by
With these notations, the evolution of the wealth on the risky asset account is given by
and, by definition of the tax basis B and (2.3), we have
Observe that the contribution of the sales in the dynamics of K t is evaluated at the basis price. For any given initial condition (Y 0− , K 0− ), (2.7)-(2.8) define a unique F-adapted process (Y, K) taking values in R 2 + , the nonnegative orthant of R 2 . In addition to the trading activities, the investor consumes in continuous time at the rate C = {C t , t ≥ 0}. Here, C is an F-progressively measurable process with (2.9)
C ≥ 0 and
Then, the bank component of the wealth process satisfies the dynamics
Since the processes Y and K have been defined previously, the above dynamics uniquely defines an F-adapted process X valued in R for any given initial condition X 0− . Remark 2.3. In Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang [12] , the nonrisky asset is also subject to a constant proportional taxation rule. This is obviously caught by our model by interpreting r as the after-tax instantaneous interest rate.
For later use, we report the dynamics of the corresponding liquidation value process defined in (2.5), which follows from (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10): (ii) Given an initial condition s = (x, y, k) ∈ R × R + × R + and a consumption-investment strategy ν, we denote by S s,ν = (X s,ν , Y s,ν , K s,ν ) the unique strong solution of (2.7), (2.8), (2.9) , and (2.10) with initial condition S The admissibility conditions imply that the process S s,ν is valued in the closureS of
We partition the boundary of
The consumption-investment problem.
The investor preferences are characterized by a power utility function with constant relative risk aversion coefficient 1 − p ∈ (0, 1):
The restriction on the relative risk aversion coefficient to (0, 1) allows us to simplify the analysis of this paper, as the boundary condition on ∂ z S is easily obtained; see Proposition 3.2. However, several of our results hold for a general parameter p < 0, and we will indicate whenever it is the case. For every initial data s ∈S and any admissible strategy ν ∈ A(s), we introduce the consumption-investment criterion
The consumption-investment problem is defined by (2.14)
We shall assume that the parameters r, θ, σ, p, and β satisfy the condition
which has been pointed out as a sufficient condition for the finiteness of the value function in the context of a financial market without taxes in [26] and [28] .
Review of the tax-free model.
In this section, we briefly review the solution of the consumption-investment problem when the financial market is free from taxes on capital gains. The properties of the corresponding value function are going to be useful to state relevant bounds for the maximal utility achieved in a financial market with taxes.
In the classical formulation of the tax-free consumption-investment problem [26] , the investment control variable is described by means of a unique process π which represents the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets at each time, and the consumption process C is expressed as a proportion c of the total wealth:
In this context, a consumption-investment admissible strategy is a pair of adapted processes (c, π) such that c is nonnegative and
We shall denote byĀ the collection of all such consumption-investment strategies. For every initial condition z ≥ 0 and strategy (c, π) ∈Ā, there is a unique strong solution to (2.16) that we denote byZ z,c,π . The frictionless consumption-investment problem is
Theorem 2.1 (see [26] ). Let condition (2.15) hold. Then, for all z ≥ 0,
The reduction of the model of section 2 to the frictionless case, i.e., α = 0, does not alter the value function. This can be proved by approximating any investment strategy by a sequence of bounded variation strategies. However, the investment strategies in our formulation are constrained to have bounded variation. This is needed because sales and purchases have different impacts on the bank component of the wealth process (2.10). Since the Merton optimal strategy is well known to be unique and has unbounded variation, it follows that existence fails to hold in our formulation.
First properties of the value function.
We first show that the optimal consumptioninvestment problem under taxes reduces to the Merton problem when the interest rate is zero. Letc(r, θ) be as in Theorem 2.1.
Notice that the optimal consumption-investment problem (2.14) can be expressed equivalently in terms of the state processes (Z, Y, K) instead of (X, Y, K), and observe that the interest rate parameter r is involved only in the dynamics of Z. When r = 0, the dynamics of the process Z in (2.11)
Since the dynamics of Y in (2.7) is independent of K, it follows that the value function does not depend on the variable k. Next, for Z t > 0, defining c t := C t /Z t and π t := (1−α)Y t /Z t , we see that the solution Z of the above equation is the same as the solutionZ z,c,π of (2.16). In view of the state constraint Z ≥ 0, our state dynamics in the context r = 0 is then equivalent to (2.16). Then, the only difference between the control problem V and the corresponding Merton problemV is the class of admissible trading strategies, which does not induce any difference on the value function; see Remark 2.4.
The argument in the above proof clearly does not involve the specific nature of the utility function. Therefore an analogous result holds for any utility function.
Since the tax basis is not inflated by the interest rate r, for nonzero values of r the tax basis plays a role in the solution. This explains the importance of the point r = 0.
We next discuss the value function on the boundary of the state space S. Observe that there is no a priori information on the boundary components ∂ y S and ∂ k S. This is one source of difficulty in the numerical part of this paper, as this state constraint problem needs special treatment; see [5] .
Proof. Let s be in ∂ z S, and let ν be in A(s). By the definition of the set admissible controls, the process Z s,ν is nonnegative. By Itô's lemma, together with the nonnegativity of C and K and the nondecrease of L, this provides
Let Q be the probability measure equivalent to P under which the process {θu + W u , u ≥ 0} is a Brownian motion. The process appearing on the right-hand side of the last inequality is a Q-supermartingale because it is a nonnegative Q-local martingale. By taking expected values under Q, it then follows from the last inequalities that
The value function V is nondecreasing with respect to each of the variables x, y, and k. Moreover, for (x, y, k) ∈S with z :
Proof. 1. The monotonicity property with respect to x, y, and k follows immediately from the dynamics of the problem and the bound ΔM ≤ 1.
2. Let ν = (C, L, M ) be an arbitrary strategy in A(s), and define the strategy ν := (δC, δL, M ). We easily verify that S δs,ν = δS s,ν ∈S, which implies that ν is in A(δs), and therefore
where the last equality follows from the homogeneity property of the utility function U . By the arbitrariness of ν in A(s), this shows that
, it follows from the previous step that we in fact have V (δs) = δ p V (s), and the required result follows immediately from this homotheticity property.
In the absence of taxes on capital gains, i.e., α = 0, it is easy to deduce from the concavity of U that the value function V is concave and therefore continuous. The numerical results exhibited in section 6 reveal that this property is no longer valid when α > 0. The proof of the following continuity result is obtained by first reducing the continuity problem to the ray {(x, 0, 0), x ∈ R + }. This is achieved by means of a comparison result in the sense of viscosity solutions. Then the continuity on the latter ray is proved by a direct argument.
Proposition 3.4. The function V of (3.1) is Lipschitz continuous onS. Proof. See Appendix A. We now show that it is always worth realizing capital losses whenever the tax basis exceeds the spot price of the risky asset. In other words, given s = (x, y, k) ∈S, every admissible strategy ν ∈ A(s), with K
s,ν τ > P τ ) for some stopping time τ , can be improved strictly by realizing the capital loss on the entire portfolio at time τ . This property is observed in practice and is known as a wash sale. It was stated in [12] and embedded directly in the definition of the tax basis. This result is independent of the choice of the utility function. 
i.e., a wash sale is optimal.
Proof. We organize the proof in two steps. (s) and that the resulting state process satisfies
To see this, observe that since ν and ν differ only by the jump at the stopping time τ , and ΔY ν τ = ΔY ν τ , we have
by the continuity of the process Z. Observe that the newly defined strategy ν consists in selling out the whole portfolio at time τ as ΔM τ = 1. Hence K
τ , and we compute directly from (2.8) that
where ξ is an arbitrary positive constant. Observe that (
In order to check the admissibility of the strategyν, we directly compute that
By the Gronwall inequality, this implies that Zν t > Z ν t on {t > τ}, and thereforeC > C on {t > τ} with positive Lebesgue⊗P measure. Hence J ∞ (s;ν) > J ∞ (s; ν).
Remark 3.1. It follows from the previous proposition that V (x, y, k) = V (x + y + α(k − y), 0, 0) whenever k > y. Then, we may restrict our analysis of the value function to the set {(x, y, k) ∈S : k ≤ y}. We could not find any benefit from this reduction. Even the numerical implementation is not simplified by this domain restriction because we have no natural boundary condition on {k = y}. We therefore continue our analysis of the value function V on the total domainS. Remark 3.2. The previous proposition highlights the difficulty in characterizing a solution of the optimal consumption-investment problem under taxes. The optimality of wash sales suggests that the optimal trading strategy has a local time type of behavior. We have no theoretical result to support this intuition. Our very limited information on the regularity of the value function is the main obstacle in developing a verification argument similar to that of Davis and Norman [13] .
4. The first order approximation. In this section, we provide upper and lower bounds for the value function. The upper bound expresses that there is no way for the investor to take advantage of tax credits in order to do better than in the tax-free financial market, and this holds for any utility function. Our derivation of the lower bound explicitly uses the power utility but without any restriction on the risk aversion factor p. These bounds will be used in order to obtain a first order approximation result for p < 1. 
i.e., the value function of the Merton frictionless problem with the smaller risk premiumθ α can be approached as close as possible in the context of the financial market with taxes. This result is proved by producing a sequence of admissible strategies (C n , L n , M n ) n≥1 ⊂ A(s) which approximates Merton's value function with the smaller risk premiumθ α . To give an intuitive justification of this result, we rewrite (2.11) as 
The only difference is the term rα(Y − K). However, in view of Proposition 3.5, we expect this term to be nonnegative for the optimal strategy (if it exists). This hints that the liquidation value processZ (with the above choices C and Y ) is larger than the wealth process in the fictitious tax-free financial market with a modified risk premium. This formally justifies the inequality of Proposition 4.2.
The proof reported in Appendix B exhibits an explicit sequence of strategies which mimics the optimal consumption-investment strategy in the Merton frictionless model while keeping the difference Y − K small or, equivalently, the tax basis close to the spot price of the risky asset.
Remark 4.1. Let b := r + θσ be the instantaneous mean return coefficient in our financial market. Then, the modified risk premiumθ α can be easily interpreted in terms of the modified volatility coefficient σ α = (1 − α)σ and a similarly modified instantaneous mean return coefficient
This fictitious financial market with such modified coefficients corresponds to the situation where the investor is forced to realize the capital gains or losses, at each time t, before adjusting the portfolio.
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 provide the following bounds on the value function V :
whereθ α is defined as in the statement of Proposition 4.2, andc is defined as in Theorem 2.1. Observe thatθ α = θ whenever α = 0 or r = 0. Therefore, we might expect that these bounds are tight for small interest rate or tax parameters.
where o(ξ) is a function on R with o(ξ)/ξ −→ 0 as ξ → 0, and
Proof. It is sufficient to observe that the bounds on the value function V in (4.2) are smooth functions with the identical partial gradient with respect to (r, α) at the origin. This follows from the fact that (∂θ α /∂α) = (∂θ α /∂r) = 0 at (r, α) = (0, 0). Remark 4.2. Observe that the functionc defined in Theorem 2.1 is increasing in the r variable. Then, the above first order expansion shows that the value function V is also increasing in the interest rate variable (for small interest rate and tax parameters). This is intuitively clear, as the larger interest rate provides the investor a better opportunity set.
The dependence of the value function on the tax rate α is more complex, and it depends on the initial position of the tax basis. If the initial tax basis is larger than the spot price, i.e., in a situation of capital gain loss, the investor takes immediate advantage of the tax credit, as stated in Proposition 3.5, and the value function V is increasing in α (for small α). In the opposite situation, i.e., when the initial tax basis is smaller than the spot price, the value function is decreasing in α. Finally, when the initial tax basis coincides with the spot price, the value function is not sensitive to the tax rate in the first order.
This variation of the value function (up to the first order) in terms of the tax rate α is somehow surprising. Indeed, in a capital loss situation, an increase of the tax parameter implies two opposing results:
• an increase of the tax credit is received initially by the agent;
• a larger amount of tax is paid during the infinite lifetime of the agent.
Our first order expansion shows that, for small interest rate and tax parameters, the increase of initial tax credit is never compensated by the increase of tax over the infinite lifetime. This is in agreement with Cadenillas and Pliska [7] , who found that "sometimes investors are better off with a positive tax rate." The same reasoning also shows that when there are no initial embedded capital gains (i.e., when y = k = 0) the effect of the tax parameter is only second order.
Remark 4.3. Since the lower bound in (4.2) has the same first order Taylor expansion as the value function V , we can view the corresponding strategy as nearly optimal. From the discussion following Proposition 4.2, the portfolio allocation defining the lower bound is by definition an approximation of the constant portfolio allocation
where b := σθ + r is the instantaneous mean return of the risky asset. Direct computation shows thatπ(σ α ,θ α ) ≤π(σ, θ) if and only if r
Using the data set of Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang [12] (r = 6%, b = 9%, α = 36%), we see that π(σ α ,θ α ) ≤π(σ, θ). Since this nearly optimal strategy exhibits a smaller exposition to the risky asset, the presence of taxes on capital gains contributes to explaining the equity premium puzzle highlighted by Mehra and Prescott [25] .
Notice that this observation is in contradiction with the numerical results of Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang [12] , who found that the exposition to the risky asset is increased by the presence of taxes. This is due to the fact that the bank account in their model is also subject to taxes with the same tax rate as for the risky asset, which implies that the optimal portfolio strategy in the forced realization case is given bŷ
which is increasing in α.
Characterization by the dynamic programming equation.
The chief goal of this section is to provide a characterization of V by means of a second order partial differential equation for which we shall provide a numerical solution in the subsequent section. Unfortunately, we are unable to obtain a characterization of V by the corresponding dynamic programming equation. Therefore, we shall exhibit a consistent approximation V ε as the unique solution of an approximating second order partial differential equation.
For s inS and ν = (C, L, M ) in A, the jumps of the state processes S are given by
where the vector fields g b and g s (x, y, k) are defined by
The value function of our consumption-investment problem is formally expected to solve the corresponding dynamic programming equation:
where L is the second order differential operator defined by
Observe that we have no information on the regularity of the value function V ; hence we cannot prove that V is a classical solution to (5.1). Moreover, the value function V is known only on the boundary ∂ z S (see Proposition 3.2), but there is no possible knowledge of V on ∂ y S ∪ ∂ k S. We then need to use the notion of viscosity solutions which allows for a weak formulation of solutions to partial differential equations and boundary conditions. Because g s is not locally Lipschitz continuous, it is not clear that there is a unique characterization of the value function V as the constrained viscosity solution of (5.1). Due to this technical difficulty, we isolated in the accompanying paper [5] some viscosity results for a slightly modified equation. The objective of this section is to build on these results in order to characterize the value function V as a limit of an approximating function defined as the unique viscosity solution of a conveniently perturbed equation.
For every ε > 0, we define the function
together with the approximation of g b and g s :
for s ∈ S \ ∂ z S. Notice that g s ε is locally Lipschitz continuous onS \ ∂ z S, and g s ε (s) = g s (s) whenever k ≥ 2εz. The main result of this section provides a characterization of the value function V by means of the approximating equation:
We first recall the notion of a constrained viscosity solution first introduced in [29, 30] . For a locally bounded function u :S −→ R, we shall use the classical notation in viscosity theory for the corresponding upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous envelopes: 
(ii) A locally bounded function u is a constrained viscosity supersolution of (5.2) if u * ≥ 0 on ∂ z S, and for all s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ C 2 (S) with 0 = (
. (iii) A locally bounded function u is a constrained viscosity solution of (5.2) if it is a constrained viscosity subsolution and supersolution.
In the above definition, there is no boundary value assigned to the value function on ∂ y S ∪ ∂ k S. Instead, the subsolution property holds on this boundary. Notice that the supersolution property is satisfied only in the interior of the domain S. 
We next use Theorem 5.1 of [5] , which provides a stochastic control representation of v ε,λ . In particular, it follows directly from this representation that v ε,λ (δs) = δ p v ε,λ (s) for all δ ≥ 0. This homotheticity property is obviously inherited by V ε = v ε,ε , as announced in (ii).
We now prove (i) in the next two steps.
Step 1 is the value function of the optimal consumption-investment problem with taxes and proportional transaction cost λ > 0. In order to conclude that V 0 = V , it remains to show that lim
Step 2. For fixed s ∈S,
Denote by Z λ,n the after-tax liquidation value process with consumption-investment strategy ν n in a financial market subject to taxes and constant proportional transaction cost parameter λ. See Appendix A for the precise formulation. We also denote by Z n the corresponding aftertax liquidation value process without transaction costs. Then, it follows immediately from the dynamics of these processes that
Then the stopping times
Define the strategiesν n bỹ ∞) . Clearly,ν n is admissible for the problem with transaction costs, i.e.,ν n ∈ A λ (s) in the notation of Appendix A. Then
where we use the monotone convergence theorem. By the arbitrariness of n and (5.3), this shows that V 0 = V . Finally the convergence holds uniformly on compact subsets by the monotonicity of (V ε ) and the continuity of the limit V .
Numerical estimate for V .
We have stated in the previous section that the value function V is approximated by the functions (V ε ) ε>0 , where, for each ε > 0, V ε can be computed as the unique viscosity solution of the boundary value problem (5.2). In this section, we provide a numerical estimate for V , based on a numerical scheme for (5.2). Unfortunately, we have no theoretical convergence result for our algorithm. Indeed, as discussed in the introduction, establishing convergence results for Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations corresponding to singular control problems is an open question in numerical analysis. We therefore follow previous related works such as [1] and [31] by concentrating our effort on realizing the empirical convergence of the algorithm.
Following Akian, Menaldi, and Sulem [1], we adopt a numerical scheme based on the finite difference discretization and the classical Howard algorithm. For the convenience of the reader we briefly describe it hereafter, and we refer the reader to [1] for a detailed discussion. 
Next, for a vector ξ ∈ R 2 + , we define the vector ζ ∈ [0, 1) 2 by
This reduces the domain of V ε from R 2 + to the bounded domain [0, 1) 2 . By changing variables, it is immediately checked that Ψ ε is a continuous constrained viscosity solution on [0, 1)×[0, 1) of
where the control set A and the expressions of β,
, and g are obtained by immediate calculation.
Finite differences for (6.1).
We adopt a classical finite difference discretization in order to obtain a numerical scheme for (6.1). Let N be a positive integer, and set h := 1 N , the finite difference step; we set e 1 := (1, 0) and e 2 := (0, 1), and we define the uniform gridS h := [0, 1] 2 ∩ (hZ) 2 . We denote by ζ h := (ζ h 1 , ζ h 2 ) a point of the gridS h , and we set S h := (0, 1) × [0, 1) ∩ (hZ) 2 . In order to define a discretization of (6.1), we approximate the partial derivatives of Ψ ε by the corresponding backward and forward finite differences
where the finite difference operators are defined for i = j ∈ {1, 2} by
In order to compute these differences at every point of S h , we extend Ψ ε as follows:
. This provides a system of (N − 1)N nonlinear equations with the (
The classical Howard algorithm.
To solve (6.2) we adopt the classical Howard algorithm, which can be described as follows:
Step 0:
start from an initial value for the control a 0 ∈ A,
Step
7. Numerical results. We implement the above numerical algorithm with the following parameters: p = 0.3, σ = 0.3, and β = 0.1.
We also fix the instantaneous mean return of the risky asset to b := θσ + r = 0.11.
Our numerical experiments showed that by taking a finite difference step 1/20 ≤ h ≤ 1/40 our algorithm converges within a reasonable computation time: convergence error |Ψ 
where N (N − 1) is the total number of points in the grid, V h ε is the approximation of V ε obtained by our numerical scheme, and
As expected, the relative error is zero at the origin and increases when the values of the parameters r and α increase. The error size is large due to the boundary effects. Indeed, in Figure 2 we focus our attention on a region away from the boundary and concentrate on (y, k) ∈ [0, 1] 2 (i.e., a region with small initial embedded capital gains). We observe that the average relative error is remarkably small and is of the order of 4% for realistic values of r and α. This figure is our main numerical result, as it shows the reasonable accuracy of the first order Taylor approximation V app of the value function V .
Welfare analysis.
In view of Remark 4.3, an ε-maximizing strategy is given by the constant portfolio allocationπ α and the constant consumption-wealth ratioc(r,θ α ). The expected utility realized by following this approximating strategy corresponds to the lower boundṼ (z) =c(r,θ α )z p /p of Proposition 4.2.
In order to compare this approximating strategy to the optimal one, we report in Figures  3 and 4 the welfare cost, z * such that The welfare cost is nonincreasing with respect to the tax basis and remains relatively small for reasonable values of the parameters α: it reaches a maximum of 8% for α = 0.2 and of 12% for α = 0.36.
Optimal consumption-investment strategies.
Throughout this subsection we implement our numerical algorithm with the following parameters: p = 0.3, β = 0.1, b := r + θσ = 0.11, σ = 0.3, and r = .07.
The tax-free model. For α = 0.0, our algorithm produces the well-known results of the Merton frictionless model. Given the above values of the parameters, Merton's optimal strategy is given byπ = 0.6349 andc = 0.1074. Figure 5 reports the numerical solution for the function V h ε . We verify that the function V h ε in this tax-free context does not depend on the variable ξ 2 , so that the value function V h ε does not depend on the k component. We also see that the value function is concave. Figure 6 reports the optimal investment strategy and produces the expected partition of the state space into three regions:
• The region of no transaction (NT) corresponds to positions such that the proportion of wealth allocated to the risky asset y/(x + y) is equal toπ. In this region no position adjustment is considered by the investor.
• The Sell region is where the investor immediately sells risky assets so as to attain the region NT by moving along the ray (1, −1). • The Buy region is where the investor immediately purchases risky assets so as to attain the region NT by moving along the ray (−1, 1). We numerically verify again that this partition is independent of the variable ξ 2 .
The value function approximation with taxes. We next concentrate on the case where the tax coefficient is positive. Figures 7 and 8 report the numerical solution for the function V h ε for α = 0.2 and 0.36. The main observation out of these numerical results is that, for a positive tax parameter, the value function is no longer concave. This surprising feature leads to mathematical difficulties, as we had to derive the dynamic programming equation without any a priori knowledge that the value function is continuous. Optimal investment strategy under taxes. Figures 9 and 10 show that, for positive α, the domain is again partitioned into three nonintersecting regions:
• The no-transaction region NT is where no portfolio adjustment is performed by the optimal investor.
• The Sell region is where the investor immediately sells risky assets so as to attain the region NT by moving towards the origin along the ray
• The Buy region is where the investor immediately purchases risky assets so as to attain the region NT by moving along the ray (−1, 1, 1) = −g b . For positive α, the boundaries of the no-transaction region depend on the tax basis. The range of the proportion of wealth allocated to the risky asset, (y/z), for which no-transaction is optimal, is very sensible to the values of the tax basis (k/z). Indeed, we observe that the Buy region is limited from the left side by the wash-sales region which is part of the Sell region, exactly according to the statement of Proposition 3.5.
We also observe that, for small values of the k variable, the no-transaction region NT contains the Merton optimal portfolio proportionsπ(σ, θ) andπ(σ α ,θ α ) corresponding, respectively, to our financial market and to the fictitious financial market with modified parameters.
Optimal consumption strategy under taxes. Figures 11 and 12 report the consumptionwealth ratio for α = .2 and .36. We notice that this ratio depends on the value of the basis as well as on proportion of wealth allocated to the risky asset. Moreover, in the presence of taxes, on each point of the grid this ratio is higher than Merton's optimal consumption-wealth ratio.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 3.4. In order to prove the continuity of V , we follow [5] by introducing the approximation v λ defined as the value function of the control problem 
The above control problem corresponds to an optimal consumption investment problem with capital gains taxes and proportional transaction cost λ > 0 on purchased risky assets. Clearly,
For later use, we recall the following results from [5] . Theorem A.1. For λ ≥ 0, the function v λ is a constrained viscosity solution of
Theorem A.2. For λ > 0, let u be an upper semicontinuous viscosity subsolution of (A.3) and v be a lower semicontinuous viscosity supersolution of (A.3), with
We first need to prove the continuity of v λ . Lemma A.1. The function v λ is continuous onS. Proof. By Proposition 4.1, the semicontinuous envelopes v λ * and v λ * satisfy the polynomial growth condition v λ * − v λ * + ∈ USC p (S). We also know from Theorem A.1 that they are, respectively, a constrained subsolution and supersolution of (5.1). We now claim that 
Before proving these inequalities, let us complete the proof of v λ * = v λ * on {(x, 0, 0) : x ≥ 0}. For an arbitrary x ∈ R + , let {s n = (x n , y n , k n ), n ≥ 1}, {s n = (x n , y n , k n ), n ≥ 1} be two sequences inS such that
By (A.5), together with the homotheticity property of Proposition 3.3, we see that
where z n = x n + (1 − α)y n + αk n and z n = x n + (1 − α)y n + αk n . Letting n → ∞ in the above inequalities and recalling that z n , z n + y n → x, we get the required result. We now turn to the proof of (A.5).
• The left-hand side of (A. Notice that dπ t = f (u)du + g(u)dW u , t ≥ τ m , with uniformly bounded processes f and g. We then estimate 
